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1 Introduction
The recent discovery at the LHC of a particle with properties matching those expected of the
Higgs boson is a decisive event in the history of particle physics. The present special section
combines three contributions that approach conceptual and methodological challenges related
to  this  event  and  the  current  situation  in  particle  physics  from  different  angles.  One
contribution  studies  the  experimental  practices of  contemporary  particle  physics  by
investigating the role of computer simulations in  these practices; in particular, it focuses on
the  status  of  simulations  as  compared  to  experiments  that  in  some  circumstances  have
analogous functions. One contribution investigates the status of the controversial naturalness
problem that many physicists see as the most severe shortcoming of the Standard Model of
elementary  particle  physics.  Finally,  a  third  contribution  critically  assesses  the  impact  of
suggested no-go theorems concerning the interpretability of rigorous algebraic quantum field
theory in terms of particles at the phenomenological level. In what follows we present a short
overview of these contributions, highlighting some of their central ideas and arguments and
putting them into context. 
2 Overview of the contributions
2.1 Simulations and experiments
The contribution by Michela Massimi and Wahid Bhimji highlights crucial  features of the
experimental context in which discoveries in particle physics such as that of the Higgs particle
are made. They do so by elucidating the status of computer simulations in these discoveries.
Simulations have come to play a crucial and ineliminable role in all areas of physics and in
recent  years  there has  been a  lively philosophical  debate  concerning the  significance  and
legitimacy of this role. 
Philosophers have focused, in particular, on the comparison  of simulations and ordinary
experiments  as  alternative,  potentially  rival,  means  of  acquiring  knowledge  about  some
physical target system. Various authors (e.g.  Guala 2005, Morgan 2005, Giere 2009) have
called  for  caution  concerning  the  representational  and  inferential  trustworthiness  of
simulations  as  compared  to  experiments  by  endorsing  claims  of  epistemic  priority of
experiments over simulations. In particular, these authors claim that simulations lack a crucial
feature  that  experiments  have,  a  feature  that  enables  one  to  draw  reliable  inferences
concerning the target system under study. Namely, unlike ordinary experiments, simulations
do not involve a causal interaction with the target system. According to the critics mentioned,
this  feature  of  simulations  severely  limits  the  trustworthiness  of  claims  concerning  the
representational adequacy of the models used in the simulations and significantly constrains
the inferences that can be reliably drawn from the simulations. 
Massimi  and  Bhimji  attack  the  thesis  of  the  epistemic  priority  of  experiments  over
simulations by criticizing a core assumption that is shared by all its defenders: the assumption
that simulations do not involve causal interaction with their target physical systems whereas
ordinary experiments do. To assess this assumption, Massimi and Bhimji carefully distinguish
between various ways in which experiments involve causal interaction with target systems,
i.e. different ways in which simulations might lack some crucial feature of experiments. In a
case study concerning the use of simulations in various stages of the ATLAS experiment at
the LHC they find that simulations do in fact involve causal interactions with target systems
in  all  the  ways specified.  In  particular,  they  point  out  that  simulations  play  key roles  in
calibration,  in  the  tracking of  causal  interactions  and in  causal  inferences  concerning the
existence of hypothesized entities. These observations, they suggest, speak against the view
that simulations lack causal interaction with target systems. Furthermore, they observe that
where  simulations  compete  directly  with  experiments  as  a  means  of  extracting  the  same
information, e.g. in background detection, simulations often provide the much-needed higher
accuracy. Massimi and Bhimji take this to support their case against the epistemic priority of
experiments over simulations. 
2.2 Naturalness
The fact that the Standard Model of elementary particle physics violates a criterion commonly
called  naturalness is widely regarded as one of  its most  serious shortcomings  by particle
physicists;  indeed, perhaps  as  its most  serious  shortcoming.  In  the  Standard  Model,  the
violation  of  naturalness  arises  from  the  so-called  hierarchy  problem:  the  fact  that  the
electroweak scale  is  much smaller than the scale where the Standard Model breaks down
(possibly as large as the Planck scale) and hitherto unknown physics is expected to set in. This
problem is connected directly to the Higgs mechanism (it is equivalent to the problem of why
the Higgs mass is so much smaller than the Planck mass), and worries about it underlie many
worries about the Higgs mechanism being merely an ad hoc solution to the problems of mass
generation that it was designed to solve (Friederich et al. 2014). Attempts to overcome this
hierarchy problem by developing models and theories that conform to naturalness have long
dominated theoretical high energy physics. In particular, this criterion is one of the driving
forces behind searches for so-called  supersymmetric partner particles of known  elementary
particles, which—should they be revealed to exist—might dispel the naturalness problem or
at least make it much less severe. 
Given  its  enormous  influence,  significance  and  conceptual  intricacy,  the  criterion  of
naturalness  has  attracted  surprisingly  little  attention  from  philosophy  of  science.  Porter
Williams’ paper Naturalness, the autonomy of scales, and the 125 GeV  Higgs provides both
an analysis of competing accounts of what exactly the naturalness problem amounts to, and an
outline of the problem’s ontological ramifications. The notion of naturalness that Williams
singles out as the one which captures best how physicists actually use the naturalness criterion
is centred around the idea that in natural theories the low-energy physical phenomena should
not  depend  sensitively  on  high-energy  phenomena.  Williams  compares  this  account  of
naturalness  to  rival  accounts,  which  either  tie  naturalness  to  quadratic  divergences  in  the
renormalization flow, construe it as a symmetry principle, interpret is as an anti-fine-tuning
condition or denigrate its status to a merely aesthetic criterion. Williams argues that none of
these other accounts of naturalness can  do justice to its actual application, nor to what are
considered worrisome violations of naturalness in physical practice. 
Williams outlines the ontological ramifications of the breakdown of naturalness associated
with the hierarchy problem. He argues that this breakdown gives us strong hints against the
conception of reality as a layered hierarchy of “quasi-autonomous domains”, as advocated in
Cao and Schweber (1993,  p. 72). According to Williams, since the Higgs mass exhibits an
extremely strong dependence on the details of whatever occurs at extremely high energies,
quasi-autonomy as claimed by Cao and Schweber does not seem to obtain. 
In view of its violation in the Standard Model of elementary particle physics, might it not
be a good idea to abandon naturalness altogether as a principle of theory choice? Williams
argues that long-standing experiences, in particular the success of the effective field theories
viewpoint, lead one to expect that successful theories in particle physics will indeed conform
to naturalness, and he highlights the support that this expectation receives from a formal result
known as the decoupling theorem (Applelquist and Carazzone 1975). 
Williams’ considerations sit well with considerations recently put forward by James Wells
in this journal (Wells 2015). Wells argues for a kind of naturalness that can be seen as an
instance of optimistic meta-induction: Starting from a naturalness problem that arises from the
smallness of the electron mass as compared to the mass scale set by Fermi’s theory of the
weak interaction,  Wells  suggests a series of compelling inferential  steps of modifying the
theory that culminate in the introduction of a scalar boson with exactly the features of the
Higgs boson. Thus, according to Wells, many historical steps towards the Standard Model that
turned out to be empirically valid might have been taken based on naturalness alone as a
guide in theory building. The considerations offered by Williams and Wells may be taken to
suggest that one should not abandon naturalness as a guide in theory choice, even though in
the  present  situation  of  particle  physics  there  is  hardly  any  empirical  support  for
straightforwardly natural alternatives to the Standard Model. 
2.3 Particle phenomenology
Modern theories of particle physics are formulated in the language of quantum field theory. It
is therefore prima facie disturbing that there are various no-go theorems that seem to rule out
interpreting quantum field theories as incorporating the constraint of relativistic causality in
terms  of  localizable  particles.  How  can  these  results  be  reconciled  with  the  spectacular
empirical successes of modern particle physics as the discovery of the Higgs particle? 
A step towards an answer to this question was made in an influential paper by Halvorson
and Clifton (2002). The paper not  only reviewed and generalized  the no-go theorems on
particle  interpretations  and  proved  them  explicitly  within  the  framework  of  the
mathematically rigorous algebraic framework for quantum field theories, but at the same time
assessed  their  scope and  relevance.  Halvorson and Clifton  pointed  out  that,  even  though
algebraic  quantum  field  theories  do  not  permit  an  interpretation  in  terms  of  a  particle
ontology, there may still be room to accommodate for apparent particle  phenomenology in
these  theories,  to  a  degree  that  allows  compatibility  with  the  manifest  empirical  facts.
Halvorson and Clifton base their conciliatory strategy concerning the no-go theorems on the
evocation of almost (rather than fully) local observables. 
Somewhat disturbingly, Arageorgis and Stergiou (2013) recently posed a new challenge to
the conciliatory strategy, based on a novel result in the algebraic approach. They interpret the
result as demonstrating an essential incompatibility of relativistic causality and almost local
observables, and argue that particle detectors that implement these observables would lead to
act-outcome correlations across the entire space-time. Thus, they would be in conflict with an
interpretation in terms of sufficiently localizable particles. 
Giovanni  Valente’s  contribution  to  this  special  section assesses  the  significance  of  the
result by Arageorgis and Stergiou. He argues that, on closer inspection, there is no conflict
between  Arageorgis’  and  Stergiou’s  result  and  the  idea  of  approximately  localized
observables. The apparent threat to particle phenomenology can be diffused, Valente argues, if
one recognizes that almost local observables are not genuine observables inasmuch as acts of
measurement always take place within bounded, “local”, space-time regions. The observables
that pertain to these regions all obey the relativistic causality principle, ensuring that there can
be no act-outcome correlations across space-time for the results of their measurement. The
appeal to almost local observables nevertheless suffices to preserve a particle phenomenology
in  that  measurement  of  local  observables  can  mimick  measurement  of  almost  local
observables to arbitrary degrees of accuracy. 
Valente  concludes  his  paper  by  noting  that  even though the  door  to  reading algebraic
quantum field  theory  as  licensing  particle  phenomenology  remains  open,  the  door  to  the
foundational challenge of specifying a suitable ontology for algebraic quantum field theory
remains open as well. 
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